

107TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 2889

To lift the nuclear test sanctions against India.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 14, 2001

Mr. LANTOS (for himself, Mr. ACKERMAN, and Mr. McDERMOTT) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

A BILL

To lift the nuclear test sanctions against India.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “U.S.-India Security
5 Cooperation Act of 2001”.

6 **SEC. 2. PURPOSE.**

7 The purpose of this Act is to lift sanctions imposed
8 upon India as a result of its nuclear tests of May 11 and
9 13, 1998, in order to foster closer security, nonprolifera-
10 tion, and political relationships with India.

1 **SEC. 3. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

2 (a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds as follows:

3 (1) India demonstrated that it had a nuclear
4 capability when it tested a nuclear explosive device
5 in 1974, but exercised remarkable restraint for 24
6 years in foregoing the development and deployment
7 of a nuclear arsenal of warheads.

8 (2) India has fought a war with the People's
9 Republic of China, which has its own arsenal of tac-
10 tical and intercontinental-range nuclear arms, over
11 territory which is still in dispute.

12 (3) Pakistan has been engaged in long-standing
13 and continuing cooperation with the People's Repub-
14 lic of China on the development of weapons of mass
15 destruction, including the purchase of nuclear-cap-
16 able missiles and missile production technology and
17 possibly nuclear warhead design information, and
18 both countries have recently been sanctioned by the
19 United States Government for continuing missile co-
20 operation.

21 (4) India has announced that it would volun-
22 tarily observe a moratorium on further nuclear tests.

23 (5) The Government of India has also dem-
24 onstrated a strong commitment to prohibit the ex-
25 port of equipment and technology that could pose a

1 risk of increasing the proliferation of weapons of
2 mass destruction, either in the region or world-wide.

3 (6) India has proven itself to be a stable democ-
4 racy, with respect for the rule of law, free speech
5 and free press, respect for human rights, and free-
6 dom of religion.

7 (7) India can be a vital strategic partner of the
8 United States on a broad range of common political
9 and security interests.

10 (8) The United States has established a dia-
11 logue with India on stronger export controls on
12 goods, equipment, and technology that could be used
13 in the development of weapons of mass destruction
14 and the means to deliver them.

15 (9) The United States and India have also es-
16 tablished joint working groups to counter terrorism
17 and drug trafficking in the region.

18 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the
19 Congress that the sanctions against India are ineffective
20 and counter-productive to both the nonproliferation goals
21 of the United States and the national interests of the
22 United States. It is further the sense of the Congress that
23 the United States should immediately expand its non-
24 proliferation, counterterrorism, counter-drug trafficking,
25 and security cooperation activities with India at all levels.

1 **SEC. 4. LIFTING OF NUCLEAR TEST SANCTIONS AGAINST**
2 **INDIA.**

3 Section 102(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the Arms Export Control
4 Act (22 U.S.C. 2799aa–1(b)(1)(B)(ii)) is amended by in-
5 serting “after May 13, 1998” after “device”.

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